The recent public discussion in Russia about the use of nuclear weapons against the West was in fact a discussion about how Moscow can extricate itself from the difficult situation it finds itself in and what price it is willing to pay for victory.
Does Russia have the right to launch a first nuclear strike, and is it time to launch it? These issues have recently become the subject of an unprecedented tone and content of public discussion in Russia up to the level of Russian President Vladimir Putin.
The world has learned nothing new about Russia’s nuclear arsenal, the conditions that Moscow considers necessary to become nuclear, or the chances that it will happen. Instead, the discussion turned into a discussion about Russia’s current position in the world.
The discussion was started by Sergei Karaganov, Honorary Chairman of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy of Russia. In an article published in mid-June, he argued that “this military operation [in Ukraine] cannot end in a decisive victory without forcing the West to strategically withdraw or even surrender.” Therefore, according to him, it is necessary to scare the West with Russia’s readiness to use nuclear weapons, and then, perhaps, “hit a bunch of targets in a number of countries to bring the crazy ones to their senses.” Karaganov summarized his point of view by saying that the winners are not judged in war.
Previous calls to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine have come from Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov. Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev regularly hints at such a scenario . But the direct propaganda of nuclear war by Karaganov, a member of the main Russian expert community, forced other members of this community to contribute.
The opinion of most other experts can be gleaned from the titles of their articles: Preemptive Nuclear Strike? No! ”, “ Why can’t we sober up the West with a nuclear bomb ”, and “ Nuclear war is a bad way to solve the problem ”. One argued that Russia could achieve all its goals with conventional weapons and that Karaganov’s proposal only played into the hands of the West; another stressed the unpredictable consequences and unacceptable cost of nuclear weapons. The only significant public figure who supported Karaganov was Dmitry Trenin , a professor at the Moscow Higher School of Economics.
Even Putin has joined the discussion about the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Answering a question at a plenary meeting of the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, Putin said : “Firstly, we do not see the need for their use, and, secondly, considering this even as possible factors for lowering the threshold for the use of such weapons.”
Indeed, an analysis of the texts written by the supporters of the first strike shows that they are actually looking for a way out for Russia from the difficult situation in which it found itself in Ukraine. Trenin, for example, wrote that “nuclear deterrence, which many in Moscow counted on as an effective means of securing the vital interests of the country, turned out to be much more limited in application.” This is a fair remark.
Russia’s nuclear power status, of course, keeps the West from intervening directly in Ukraine’s affairs (although it’s not clear if Western countries would want that, even without this deterrent). But this in no way prevents them from supporting Kyiv with weapons, intelligence, training and sanctions.
In general, Western countries do not assess the likelihood of Russia using nuclear weapons as high. They believe that this will mean many deaths, destruction of infrastructure and, perhaps most importantly, huge reputational damage for the Russian authorities. It is not certain that a nuclear strike will help Russia achieve its goals. In any case, the risk of escalation and a nuclear response would be very high.
It is this kind of calculation that explains why nuclear weapons have not been used on the battlefield since 1945. Instead, it was used in exceptional cases, when the very existence of the state was threatened. The question is, what are “exceptional circumstances”?
The West, for the most part, refuses to believe that military defeat and a return to the 2014 borders (before the annexation of Crimea) can be such circumstances for Moscow, on the grounds that if Russia existed within these borders before, it can do it again . This logic is supported by the fact that after Putin promised to use “any means” to preserve the country’s territorial integrity after annexing four Ukrainian regions last year, he then approved a Russian retreat from Kherson, the capital of one of those regions.
The Russian leadership is clearly trying to find a way in which nuclear threats could strengthen its position in Ukraine and give it an edge in the confrontation with the West. The Russian Foreign Ministry, for example, regularly claims that military escalation could provoke a nuclear war. But cannot provide any details about the chain of events that would have led to this outcome.
Indeed, most in the West believe that the nuclear threat from Russia is negligible. If Karaganov wanted to be taken seriously, he needed to explain, at the very least, why a nuclear outcome was desirable for Russia. However, this part of his article was severely missing.
Karaganov did not say anything about the goals of a nuclear strike, nor about the conditions for making a decision on a nuclear strike, nor about Moscow’s famous “red lines”. All he has are the controversial claims that the use of nuclear weapons will force the West to back down.
On closer inspection, the discussion about nuclear weapons is really a discussion about whether there are more important things for Russia, its leaders and people than winning the war with the West. In the world described by Karaganov and Trenin, the answer is no. They view the confrontation with the West as existential and argue that since Moscow has fewer resources than its enemies, the first strike is logical.
However, such a position is unacceptable not only for Russian specialists in nuclear policy, but also, as far as one can judge, for the Russian leadership. In addition to the obvious counterarguments and risks, there is an understanding that Russia also has other national interests and that the current situation, although unpleasant, does not lead to the total destruction of the country, unlike the use of nuclear weapons.
Proponents of a first nuclear strike like Karaganov and Trenin not only failed to intimidate their foreign opponents, but, as recent discussion shows, they even failed to win over their colleagues. Ordinary Russians are likely similarly opposed: A recent poll by the independent sociological agency Levada Center showed that 86 percent of Russians believe that nuclear weapons should not be used in Ukraine under any circumstances.
Of course, none of this guarantees that nuclear weapons will not be used. This decision will be made by one person: the President of Russia. And it will be informed and advised by a group of people, not including the experts who took part in the recent discussion. One can only hope that the consensus of the Russian expert community and the opinion of ordinary people mean something.
Source: Carnegieen Dowment
